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ELDER LAW—MY LIFE, MY CHOICE
Hyman G. Darling, Esq.* & Andrew Adams†
As the most recent past president of the National Academy of Elder
Law Attorneys (NAELA) I have been involved in elder law for over
thirty years, even before there was a sub-practice of estate planning
called elder law. In fact, for estate planning, I recall when the primary
document a client needed was a will. The required document has
expanded and now includes a will, health proxy, power of attorney, a
POLST form (Physician’s Order for Life Sustaining Treatment),
sometimes a living will, and other various documents a client may
desire, such as a cremation order, a pre-arranged burial, and the like.
Many years ago, it was also the norm that many wished to be kept
alive by machines, or did not take a stand as to their preference, with
many families refusing to talk about it. It was also the norm that most
people were buried and not cremated. Times have changed, and the
pendulum has swung the other way in many cases. I remember how
my mother was ill for many years, and it was determined that all
measures would be taken to keep her alive, even at the end of her life
when there was absolutely no chance of recovery.

* Hyman G. Darling, Esq., is the chair of the estate planning and elder law department at
the law firm Bacon Wilson, P.C., where his areas of expertise include all aspects of estate
planning, probate, and elder law; an alumnus of and Adjunct Professor at Western New England
University School of Law, where he contributes to the future practice of law through his work
in the University’s Elder Law and Estate Planning LLM practicum. Attorney Darling is the
most recent past president of the National Academy of Elder Law Attorneys, a former president
of both the Hampden County Bar Association and Hampden County Estate Planning Council,
and a member of many civic and professional associations, including the Planned Giving
Committees of the American Cancer Society and Baystate Medical Center. First person
references in this Article are from Hyman G. Darling’s point of view.
† Andrew Adams is a fourth-year part-time evening law student at Western New England
University School of Law and a member of the Western New England Law Review. He is a
veteran of the United States Navy and worked as a Correctional Officer for the Hampden County
Sheriff’s Department while in law school.
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FOREWORD
BY HYMAN G. DARLING, ESQ.
The issue of end of life decisions was brought to the forefront when I
attended a Dana Farber Society dinner in Boston, Massachusetts during
which there was an awareness brought up by the keynote speaker Dr. Atul
Gawande. One needs only to read any of Dr. Gawande’s publications or
enter his name in a Google search to allow him to educate people and
focus on the issues relative to end-of-life decisions. In addition, at the
2018 annual meeting of the NAELA, one of my esteemed colleagues,
Peter Strauss—one of the founders of elder law and an advocate for
allowing end-of-life decisions to be made—suggested that elder law
attorneys should advocate to discuss these issues more in-depth when
meeting with their clients. After hearing both Dr. Gawande and Attorney
Strauss, I began to think more about these issues when advising clients.
However, it was not until recently that this matter personally hit home,
causing me to reflect on the issue again and become more focused on
writing an article on the topic. I probably spend more time than other
attorneys discussing end-of-life situations with clients, especially those
who are competent and not in a period of distress, allowing the discussion
to be held more easily, as opposed to when a client is toward the end of
his or her life and may not be as receptive to discussing the issue.
The story began in 1991 when I was appointed as conservator of Alan,
who was then in his late twenties and a relatively healthy, though disabled,
American Veteran. I was appointed because Alan was basically a
spendthrift and unable to handle his finances, although he was mentally
competent to make his own decisions. As with many Veterans of that era,
he was a heavy smoker, and was not a very healthy eater as he lived alone
for many years. Alan was always competent to make his decisions relative
to day-to-day living, but it was my responsibility to make all of his
payments, attend to his rent and taxes, and provide him an allowance
based on the funds he received from the government.
Alan lived independently for many years until he moved into an
apartment-like setting in a dormitory where his meals were covered,
activities were provided to him on a daily basis, and he was with other
Veterans who were similarly situated to Alan. I provided him with a bus
pass so that he could get around wherever he wanted. He had sufficient
spending money to attend to all of his needs, and if he wanted something
additional, I usually provided it for him, as his needs were relatively
minimal. Alan was a likeable guy who knew what he wanted, but he
probably spoke with my legal assistant more than anyone else in his life
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(sometimes three to five times a day) and he also spoke to me when it was
needed. Most of our exchanges were conversational and merely to let me
know what his plans were for the days or weeks ahead.
It was at the 2018 NAELA conference when I received a phone call
and learned that Alan had fallen ill and was in the hospital. I was told that
it was not life threatening and that Alan was competent and was allowed
to make most of his medical decisions. I had intended to spend an extra
day in New Orleans after the conference, but I decided to switch my
schedule and return a day early. Upon returning, I received a voicemail
that Alan was still in the hospital and was not doing too well. Over the
previous few days I had been speaking with him, his physician, and his
nurse, and it was determined that his breathing problems had
exacerbated—probably as a result of years of smoking. He usually took
a nebulizer and was afforded oxygen through a nasal tube, but since his
oxygen levels had reduced, he was given oxygen directly through a mask.
He was now confined to bed. All of this happened fairly quickly in a
matter of a few days. Alan had attempted to quit smoking many times but
could not kick the habit. I even attempted to reward him by offering him
additional spending money if he quit, but this was beyond his ability.
Upon returning to my home, I received another voicemail from the
doctor that Alan’s condition was worsening. A decision had to be made
as to whether he would have a tracheotomy. Otherwise, he would be on
direct oxygen for some time. However, this would only be temporary until
his lungs continued to weaken, causing respiratory failure.
It was a Sunday morning when I drove to the hospital to meet with
Alan, his physician, and his nurse in the intensive care unit. Alan was able
to communicate with me coherently, although he had to lift up the oxygen
mask so that I could hear him. There was no question that he was mentally
capable of making his own decisions, and he was somewhat unhappy that
he could not eat since he was laying down and on oxygen. In order to get
nutrition, Alan needed a tube inserted directly into his stomach as he could
not tolerate a nasogastric tube because he still required an oxygen mask.
I had a long and hard discussion with the physician and nurse about
Alan’s options, the consequences of each option, time frames for living
and mortality, and quality-of-life issues. The doctor suggested I discuss
these options with Alan, and I insisted that the doctor be present during
the discussion to be sure that I was communicating all options correctly.
With tears in my eyes, I had to inform Alan, who had been my
responsibility for over twenty-seven years, of the unfortunate prognosis.
Alan was given the opportunity to make these decisions himself. One
being that he would need the tracheotomy and may be confined to an
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institution for some time with no guarantees as to his future living
arrangements since his lungs had already been compromised and probably
would not repair, requiring him to have artificial respiration forever. The
other option presented to him was that he could be taken off oxygen, at
which time he would probably succumb to death within hours.
After presenting these options to Alan, I think that the nurse and
doctor had to comfort me more than Alan. He took the news so well and
it was amazing to hear him state unequivocally that he wished to die a
painless death. He would not be required to be connected to any medical
apparatus nor to be maintained through artificial means—even if the
decision he made was to hasten the moment of his death. We discussed
the options fully and clearly, and Alan was asked what his wishes were.
He asked for a tuna fish sandwich and vanilla ice cream. Within minutes,
they were delivered to him, and he was transferred from the bed to the
chair, and his oxygen was removed. His oxygen levels went down
approximately twenty percent almost immediately and continued to drop.
After he ate his last meal, he asked to be put in bed, as he was having a bit
of discomfort and difficulty breathing. He was given morphine for
comfort, and we discussed lots of issues over the next several minutes
before he drifted into a deep sleep. He told me he was done living, he had
lived a good life with no regrets, and he was confident in his decision—
basically without any emotion. Alan passed away within two hours while
I sat there. His death was painless, peaceful, and non-invasive.
Without the education I had received in the months prior to this event,
from my colleagues and Dr. Atul Gawande, I probably would not have
been able to work with the medical personnel in allowing Alan to die the
way he wished. Fortunately, I had been educated sufficiently to know that
he could make his own decisions without the need for any court
intervention or ethics committees. It was Alan’s decision. It was based
on the clear and concise advice provided by the physician, the nurse, and
myself. This death should not be considered unfortunate or sad. It was
the end of Alan’s time, and he made the educated and informed decision
to allow his death to occur without a long and arduous institutionalization
where he probably would not have had the same quality of life. He knew
he could not eat, smoke, take trips, or in any other way continue his
lifestyle the way he had. With Alan’s consent, and without any force or
coercion, he vehemently refused aggressive treatment, and he made his
decision, accepted it, and allowed his death to occur relatively swiftly,
within only a few hours of his making the decision.
As a postscript to this story, Alan’s funeral was held at the local
Department of Veterans Affairs cemetery with the full honor guard, and it
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was attended by several of his friends, personnel from the facility where
he lived for many years, and my staff. Reflecting back, this was clearly a
case where the patient made his own decision without the interference of
others and, as a result, was allowed to die peacefully. I was inspired to
put together an article relative to dying with dignity so that others may be
in a position to guide their clients in making the most appropriate
decisions for themselves.
Thank you, Dr. Gawande, Attorney Strauss, and most of all, Alan.
INTRODUCTION
First and foremost, this Article is focused on an individual’s right to
die, not an argument in support of medical aid in dying. While this Article
does not proffer an opinion upon the merits of the latter, it is necessary to
understand the differences between the two in order to fully appreciate the
concepts that this Article will discuss hereinafter. The right to die refers
to the right of an individual to protect their bodily privacy interest through
either the refusal or removal of extraordinary life prolonging measures.1
Medical aid in dying is a process through which terminally ill adults
request a prescription for medication that they may self-administer to
bring about a peaceful death.2 In order to appreciate the argument for the
right to die, it is essential to understand death as part of the natural process
of life and, also, understand the choices that individuals face with end-oflife decisions.
I.

THE RIGHT TO DIE, LIVING WILLS, AND THE MASSACHUSETTS
RESPONSE
As recently as 1945, most deaths occurred in the home. By the
1980s, just 17 percent [of deaths were at-home deaths]. Lacking a
coherent view of how people might live successfully all the way to the
very end, we have allowed our fates to be controlled by medicine,
technology, and strangers.3

1. See Right to Die, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/
dictionary/english/right-to-die [https://perma.cc/CPF8-A49A] (“[T]he belief that a person
should be allowed to die naturally rather than being kept alive by medical methods when they
are suffering and unlikely to get well.”).
2. See Caroline Simon, With D.C. and California Laws in Jeopardy, a Fresh Debate Over
Medical Aid in Dying, USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2018/06/25/
washington-dc-california-medical-aid-dying-physician-assisted-suicide/713546002/
[https://perma.cc/H6VN-YRZD] (last updated June 27, 2018, 5:25 PM).
3. Atul Gawande, No Risky Chances, in THE BEST AMERICAN SCIENCE AND NATURE
WRITING 65, 66 (Rebecca Skloot & Tim Folger eds., 2015).
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To do otherwise requires “the courage to confront the reality of our
mortality” and “the courage to act on the truth that we find.”4
Advances in medicine and technology have created a unique
challenge for the courts as the paradigm of care has shifted to one in which
prolonging life through any means has become the norm. Using life
prolonging technology, such as artificial respiration and feeding tubes, has
often become obligatory. For those who do not wish to use such devices,
the path to prevent their use has become an arduous one.
Over the last forty years, case law has developed, beginning with In
re Quinlan,5 that allows individuals to plan for the removal of these life
prolonging measures. In re Quinlan was the seminal case in determining
that an incapacitated individual’s right of privacy may be asserted on their
behalf by a guardian.6 However, this decision did not come without its
challenges and was only rendered after years of litigation, great financial
expense, nationwide publicity, and an immeasurable emotional toll on the
parents of Karen Ann Quinlan. Another major development that arose
from In re Quinlan was the general acceptance by the courts of hospital
ethics committees and their role in aiding families and courts in making
end of life decisions.7 However, this was not always the case. With the
advances in technology came challenges in the courts.
The movement continued toward a more formalized system of written
documents that “allow an individual to express his or her personal
intention . . . [regarding] whether to allow the extraordinary measure of
life support to be discontinued . . . whe[n] a determination has been made
about [the individual] being in a persistent vegetative state.”8 These
documents are called living wills but are occasionally referred to by terms

4.
5.
6.
7.

Id.
See In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 647 (N.J. 1976).
Id. at 662–64.
Mark P. Aulisio, Why Did Hospital Ethics Committees Emerge in the US?, 18 AMA J.
ETHICS 546, 547–48 (2016), https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/sites/journalofethics.amaassn.org/files/2018-05/mhst1-1605.pdf.
[T]he Quinlan case had very broad resonance, as nearly anyone could easily
imagine him- or herself in the same position as Joseph, Julia, or Karen Quinlan.
The New Jersey Supreme Court, apparently motivated in part by the fear of a
torrent of cases that would grind the judicial system to a halt, suggested that “ethics
committees” (meaning, albeit, mostly physician-dominated prognosis committees)
might play an advisory role in such cases as an alternative to the courts.
Id. at 548.
8. Scott E. Squillace, Incapacity Documents, in DRAFTING WILLS AND TRUSTS IN MASS.
§ 50.4 (Mass. Continuing Legal Educ., 4th ed. 2017).
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such as advanced health-care directives, health care proxy, POLST, or
MOLST forms.9
Typically, a living will is a document that expresses an individual’s
desire to refuse extraordinary medical treatment by artificial or
mechanical means that will probably not effect a cure but will result
merely in the painful or insensate prolongation of life, or serve only to
prolong the process of dying.10

However well intended, the living will is not specifically authorized
by statute in Massachusetts, and for a period of time it appeared the State
was not going to act upon this issue.11 On this specific issue,
Massachusetts has lagged behind other states, only passing legislation as
recently as 1990 specifically authorizing the use of advanced health care
directives or living wills.12 Politicians in the Massachusetts legislature
have on several occasions introduced bills that would codify the authority
of living wills.13 However, these proposed bills almost always end up
dead in committee. One theory regarding the failure of these bills is the
lack of involvement from the affected population (i.e., the elderly) and the
strong involvement of political opponents.14 In Massachusetts, it has been
theorized that “the dominance of the Catholic Church has shaped the
political conflict and overshadowed the power of all other groups” in their
9. Id. Although the cited source discusses the Massachusetts version of the form, the
document is generally referred to as a POLST form (Physician Orders for Life Sustaining
Treatment). About, NAT’L POLST PARADIGM, https://polst.org/about [https://perma.cc/8U8M38P5].
10. Vicki L. Ehrlichman, The 1990 Health Care Proxy Law: Beyond the Best Interests of
the State, 76 MASS. L. REV. 145, 145 (1991).
11. See Cohen v. Bolduc, 760 N.E.2d 714, 718 n.12 (Mass. 2002) (“Unlike some States,
the Massachusetts statute does not provide for instructional, as opposed to agent-delegated,
advance directives, and has no ‘living will’ provision.”). Massachusetts law did, however,
authorize the appointment of a health care proxy beginning in 1991. An Act Providing for the
Execution of Health Care Proxies by Individuals, 1990 Mass. Acts 332 (codified as MASS. GEN.
LAWS ch. 201D (1992)).
12. Ehrlichman, supra note 10, at 145 (“Although Massachusetts lagged years behind
most states in enacting living will legislation, its legislative product offsets the years of living
with a legal vacuum in this important area.”). It should be noted that the Massachusetts General
Laws still do not specifically authorize living wills but has authorized the use of a similar form
called the Massachusetts Medical Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment (MOLST),
implementing a pilot program beginning in 2010. See 2008 Mass. Acts 305. The MOLST form
will be discussed further herein.
13. See H.R. 1548, 188th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2013); H.R. 1354, 187th Gen.
Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2011); H.R. 3207, 177th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1992); H.R.
2129, 177th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. (Mass. 1991).
14. See Henry R. Glick, The Right-To-Die: State Policymaking and the Elderly, 5 J.
AGING STUD. 283, 300–01 (1991).
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advocacy and lobbying efforts against the codification of living wills and
similar statutes.15
As early as 1976, states passed legislation that codified the use of
“specified directive” forms, which could identify an individual’s intent
with regard to “withholding [or withdrawal] of life[-]sustaining
procedures.”16 Prior to 1991, California law had recognized the use of
specified directives, but put a five year limitation on the validity of the
document from the date of its execution.17 In 2008, Massachusetts
authorized the use of a Physician’s Order for Life-Sustaining Treatment
(POLST) form that would come to be known as the Massachusetts
Medical Orders for Life-Sustaining Treatment (MOLST) form.18 “[T]he
MOLST [form] is a document signed by the patient and physician
regarding a present treatment plan for a terminal illness, as opposed to the
contemplation of a future condition and a direction to act if the patient is
incapacitated.”19 While the introduction of the MOLST form was a major
step forward in end-of-life decision-making, it can only be utilized by
those with a current advanced illness,20 and thus does not go far enough to
protect the rights of citizens of the Commonwealth. In many cases, the
selection by the patient when healthy may differ significantly from
choices made when terminally ill.

15. Id. at 299.
16. Natural Death Act, 1976 Cal. Stat. ch. 1439, § 1 (codified as CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE § 7185 (West)), repealed by Stats. 1991, ch. 895 (S.B. 980) (creating a form for a directive
concerning life-sustaining procedures).
17. 1991 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 895 (S.B. 980) (“Existing law provides that the directive is
effective for 5 years from the date of execution, as specified.”). The law was amended in 1991
to remove restrictions such as the five-year limitation on the validity of the form. See id. (“This
bill would authorize the declarant to revoke the declaration at any time, as specified, but would
not otherwise limit the length of time the declaration would be effective.”); Natural Death Act,
1991 Cal. Stat. ch. 895, § 1, repealed by Stats. 1999, c. 658 (2000).
18. An Act to Promote Cost Containment, Transparency and Efficiency in the Delivery of
Quality Health Care, 2008 Mass. Acts ch. 305, §§ 41–43; see Massachusetts Medical Orders
for Life-Sustaining Treatment, MASS. MED. ORDERS FOR LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT,
https://www.molst-ma.org [https://perma.cc/VW7E-F4D6] (providing further information
regarding the MOLST form).
19. Squillace, supra note 8.
20. The Massachusetts Health Care Proxy Form, MASS. MED. ORDERS FOR LIFESUSTAINING TREATMENT, https://www.molst-ma.org/forms/the-massachusetts-health-careproxy-form [https://perma.cc/JNA6-98ZU].
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II. SCULPTING THE LANDSCAPE
A. Karen Ann Quinlan
The first landmark decision was In re Quinlan. Karen Ann Quinlan,
a twenty-one-year-old woman residing in New Jersey, was admitted to the
Newton Hospital via ambulance after two fifteen-minute bouts of
unconsciousness during which she suffered from a complete cessation of
respiration.21 She was subsequently examined and found to be in a “state
of coma, with evidence of [decorticate posturing] indicating altered level
of consciousness.”22 Karen was placed on a respirator due to her “chronic
[and] ‘persistent vegetative’ state.”23 While in this vegetative state, Karen
lost forty pounds, became locked into a fetal-like position due to the
extreme “rigidity of [her] arms, legs and related muscles and her joints
[became] severely rigid and deformed.”24 The Quinlan court approached
the matter by utilizing a three-part discussion, but rested its decision
primarily upon the fundamental right of privacy,25 explaining that “the
State’s interest . . . weakens and the individual’s right to privacy grows as
the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims.”26 The
court concluded that if the “hospital ‘Ethics Committee’ or like body of
the institution” agreed that “there [wa]s no reasonable possibility of
Karen’s ever emerging from her present comatose condition to a
cognitive, sapient state, the present life-support system may be
withdrawn.”27 Karen was subsequently removed from her respirator and
to the surprise of all, continued to breathe on her own. She went on to live
another nine years before she died on June 11, 1985.28

21. In re Quinlan, 348 A.2d 801, 806–07 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1975), modified and
remanded, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976); see Robert D. McFadden, Karen Ann Quinlan, 31, Dies;
Focus of ‘76 Right to Die Case, N.Y. TIMES (June 12, 1985), https://www.nytimes.com/1985/
06/12/nyregion/karen-ann-quinlan-31-dies-focus-of-76-right-to-die-case.html.
The actual
cause of Karen’s condition remained in controversy during the trial, as the barbiturates, Librium
and Valium, found in her blood tests were considered to be within the therapeutic range. In re
Quinlan, 348 A.2d at 806.
22. In re Quinlan, 348 A.2d at 807.
23. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 655 (N.J. 1976).
24. Id.
25. The other focal points in their deliberation were the free exercise of religion and the
right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. Id. at 661–64.
26. Id. at 664.
27. Id. at 671–72.
28. Ravi Nessman, Karen Ann Quinlan’s Parents Reflect on Painful Decision 20 Years
Later, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 7, 1996), http://articles.latimes.com/1996-04-07/news/mn-55744_1_
karen-ann-quinlan [https://perma.cc/G7VQ-3QSA]. It should be noted that Karen’s parents
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B. Nancy Beth Cruzan
The next time the courts were faced with such a challenge that
attained national attention was in Cruzan. The Cruzan Court found that
the Constitution did not prevent a state from requiring clear and
convincing evidence of an incompetent person’s wishes regarding the
withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment.29 This time the final decision
came from the Supreme Court of the United States.
Nancy Beth Cruzan was rendered incompetent as a result of severe
injuries sustained during an automobile accident.30 Cruzan was
determined to have been without oxygen for twelve to fourteen minutes.
She was in a coma for three weeks, then progressed to an unconscious
phase, commonly known as a persistent vegetative state.31 Cruzan’s
parents were informed that she “had virtually no chance of regaining her
mental faculties.”32 Upon learning such, they requested the hospital
“terminate the artificial nutrition and hydration procedures,” with the
knowledge that doing so would effectively cause her death.33 “The
employees of the hospital refused to honor this request without court
approval.”34 The Supreme Court of Missouri “recognized a right to refuse
treatment embodied in the common-law doctrine of informed consent” but
expressed doubt as to whether a fundamental right of privacy to refuse
medical treatment in every circumstance exists under the United States
Constitution.35
The Supreme Court of the United States held that “requiring clear and
convincing evidence of an incompetent patient’s wishes . . . to withdraw[]
or withhold[] . . . treatment does not violate that person’s federal
constitutional rights.”36 Additionally, the Court upheld the Supreme Court
“never sought to have her feeding tube removed during the nine years she lived after she was
taken off the respirator.” Id.
29. See Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 286–87 (1990).
30. Id. at 265.
31. Id. at 266.
32. Id. at 267.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 268.
35. Id.; Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 427 (Mo. 1988).
We find no principled legal basis which permits the coguardians in this case to
choose the death of their ward. In the absence of such a legal basis for that decision
and in the face of this State’s strongly stated policy in favor of life, we choose to
err on the side of life, respecting the rights of incompetent persons who may wish
to live despite a severely diminished quality of life.
Id.
36. 63 AM. JUR. TRIALS 1, Decisionmaking at the End of Life § 12 (1997).
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of Missouri’s rulings, including the idea that even though trial testimony
was given regarding Nancy’s own words in protest of ever facing life as a
“vegetable” (and not wanting to live like that), she did not specifically
“deal in terms with withdrawal of medical treatment or of hydration and
nutrition.”37 The Court did not, however, hold that the clear and
convincing standard of proof be required in all states. It left the setting of
this threshold to the individual states and upheld the ruling that Missouri
could defer to a standard of clear and convincing evidence of a patient’s
wishes “rather than confide the decision [to] close family members.”38
C. Theresa Marie Schiavo
Theresa Schiavo suffered cardiac arrest in the early morning hours of
February 15, 1990, due to a potassium imbalance.39 Within one year of
this sudden cardiac event, Theresa was diagnosed as being in a permanent
or persistent vegetative state.40 For the next eight years, Theresa’s
husband, Michael, acted as guardian for his wife. He was repeatedly noted
by her attending physicians and others responsible for her care as having
been “very motivated in pursuing the best medical care for his wife, even
taking her to California for a month or so for experimental treatment.”41
After eight years of medical care and experimental treatments that failed
to improve Theresa’s medical state, Michael filed a petition on May 11,
1998, for an Order for the Authorization to Discontinue Artificial Life
Support,42 which, after roughly a two-year legal battle, was finally
granted.43
This order marked the beginning of an exhausting and entrenched
legal battle over the decision to remove Theresa’s feeding tube. The battle
lasted the better half of a decade, involved over fourteen separate appeals,
the passing of new state legislation,44 a witness intervention from
37. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 285.
38. Id. at 286–87.
39. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 780 So. 2d 176, 177 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
40. The Court explained that “a persistent vegetative state is not simply a coma. She is
not asleep. She has cycles of apparent wakefulness and apparent sleep without any cognition
or awareness. As she breathes, she often makes moaning sounds. Theresa has severe
contractures of her hands, elbows, knees, and feet.” Id.
41. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, No. 90-2908GD-003, 2000 WL 34546715, at *2 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. Feb. 11, 2000), aff’d, 780 So. 2d 176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001).
42. Id. at *6–7.
43. Id. at *7.
44. See An Act Relating to the Authority for the Governor to Issue a One-Time Stay, 2003
Fla. Laws ch. 418. Following years of litigation, “Terri Schiavo’s feeding tube was removed,
only to be reinserted six days later after the Florida Legislature, in emergency session, passed a
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Congress and the President of the United States,45 and culminated with a
final denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari in 2005.46 The Florida
District Court of Appeals, in its final ruling upholding the lower court’s
Order for the Authorization to Discontinue Artificial Life Support, stated
in its reasoning that “the Supreme Court of Florida had already determined
that the express right of privacy in article I, section 23, of the Florida
Constitution gave both competent and incompetent persons the right to
forego life-prolonging procedures.”47
Further, the court relied on its own precedent in finding that this
protection extended not only to those individuals with “the foresight and
resources to prepare a living will, but also to those whose wishes have not
been reduced to writing.”48 While ultimately supporting the contention of
the husband-guardian—that Theresa’s wishes were to forego lifesustaining treatment—the court found that court intervention would be
reasonable in a future case such as this where “family members cannot
agree or when a guardian believes that it would be more appropriate for a
neutral judge to make the decision.”49 Again, the court refrained from
shifting the onus of end-of-life decision-making from their hands to that
of the individual citizen.
law that gave Gov. Jeb Bush the power to intervene in the case. The governor ordered the
feeding tube reinserted.” Rich Phillips, Florida Court Strikes Down ‘Terri’s Law’, CNN.COM:
LAW CENTER (Sept. 23, 2004, 8:47 PM) http://www.cnn.com/2004/LAW/09/23/schiavo/
index.html [https://perma.cc/KU3S-ATKV]; see also Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321, 324 n.1
(Fla. 2004) (holding “Terri’s Law” to be unconstitutional as the precise wording of the law
constituted a violation of the constitutional tenant of separation of powers).
45. See An Act for the Relief of the Parents of Theresa Marie Schiavo, Pub. L. No. 1093, 119 Stat. 15 (2005).
The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida shall have
jurisdiction to hear, determine, and render judgment on a suit or claim by or on
behalf of Theresa Marie Schiavo for the alleged violation of any right of Theresa
Marie Schiavo under the Constitution or laws of the United States relating to the
withholding or withdrawal of food, fluids, or medical treatment necessary to
sustain her life.
Id. The Senate and House of Representatives met in emergency sessions on Sunday, March 20,
2005 in order to vote on the Act, later known as the “Palm Sunday Compromise,” which was
passed shortly after midnight and signed into law on March 21, 2005 at 1:11 a.m. by President
George W. Bush, who had “cut short a visit to his ranch in Crawford, Texas . . . [in order to]
return[] to the White House . . . to sign the measure.” Bush Signs Schiavo Bill, FOX NEWS (Mar.
21,
2005),
http://www.foxnews.com/story/2005/03/21/bush-signs-schiavo-bill.html
[https://perma.cc/RPY2-EDDT].
46. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Bush v. Schiavo, No. 04-757, 2004 WL 2790640 (U.S.
Dec. 1, 2004).
47. In re Guardianship of Schiavo, 916 So. 2d 814, 815–16 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
48. Id. at 816 (citing Corbett v. D’Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986)).
49. Id.
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D. Earle N. Spring
The Massachusetts courts faced a similar situation in 1980 in
Spring.50 Earle N. Spring was a Massachusetts resident who was found
incompetent and “was receiving life-prolonging hemodialysis
treatment.”51 Earle’s wife and son petitioned the Probate Court,52 which
subsequently found that Earle “would, if competent, choose not to receive
the life prolonging treatment.”53 The court ordered an entry of judgment
that Earle’s wife and son along with the attending physician were “to make
the decision with reference to the continuance or termination of the
dialysis treatment.”54 This judgment was affirmed by the appeals court
and appealed by the guardian ad litem for further appellate review.55 In
reviewing the facts of the case, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts found that
without the dialysis treatment the ward would die; with it he might
survive for months. Survival for five years would be not probable, but
conceivable. The treatment did not cause a remission of the disease
or restore him even temporarily to a normal, cognitive, integrated,
functioning existence, but simply kept him alive.56

The Spring court discussed the balance of the state’s interests in the
preservation of life against the individual’s constitutional privacy rights
and freedom from “unwanted infringements of bodily integrity.”57 The
court further discussed the balance of timeliness and the desirability of
expediting similar cases; that they did not wish to impose a duty upon
future guardians ad litem to take appeals which they do not believe to be
meritorious; and that court orders may be “useful [for the] purpose of
resolving a doubtful or disputed question of law or fact, but . . . [would]
not eliminate all risk of liability.”58

50. See generally In re Spring, 405 N.E.2d 115 (Mass. 1980) (discussing the balancing of
the State’s interest in the preservation of life and the right of incompetent persons to be free
from invasions of bodily integrity).
51. Id. at 117.
52. Id. Earle’s son had been appointed his temporary guardian. Id.
53. Id. at 117, 122.
54. Id. at 117.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 118.
57. See id. at 119.
58. Id. at 122.
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III. PRIVATE INTERESTS SHOULD BE PARAMOUNT
Spring is an excellent illustration of the ultimate issue in many of the
previously noted cases. It directly outlines the central issue of the balance
between the state’s interest in the preservation of life and an individual’s
constitutional right to be free from unwanted infringements of bodily
integrity.59 What this Article seeks to highlight is that the individual rights
of the citizenry should be paramount in this discussion, and that the
interest of the state should be secondary to the individual’s legal
decisionmaker regarding personal medical decisions.
A. No Place for the Court
The courts should not be the primary decisionmaker when it comes
to making end-of-life decisions. Courts and those appointed as guardian
ad litem are not always properly designated to be the arbiters of family
decisions. The choices that guardians make for their family members
about withholding life-sustaining treatment are not ones that they make
hastily or without contemplation. They are decisions made based upon
years of conversations, family experiences, learned and inherited values,
and the full understanding of the essence of a person in a way that can
only be achieved by those with a deep intimate knowledge of the person.
These are not decisions that should be made by a detached and uninvolved
judge in the sterile environs of the courtroom. This idea has been
encapsulated best by medical ethicist Nancy Dublar:
[T]he courts are not, by and large, the place for medical-care dilemmas
to be settled. They are impersonal and far removed from patients’ and
families’ private values. With so many eyes watching they may
respond to personal and political interests other than the patients’.
They are not geared to deal with the issues of medical care, procedure,
and prognosis, the subtleties of how life actually works in a hospital.
For all these reasons, courts are not places to entrust your most
important health-care decisions if you can possibly avoid it.60

There are currently approximately 480 lawyers in Massachusetts that
belong to the Massachusetts Chapter of the National Academy of Elder
Law Attorneys.61 These lawyers have special training and work with
elderly clients, many of which prefer to sign a Health Care Proxy or Living
59. See id. at 119.
60. I. Glenn Cohen, Negotiating Death: ADR and End of Life Decision-Making, 9 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 253, 283 (2004) (quoting NANCY DUBLAR & DAVID NIMMONS, ETHICS ON
CALL 151–53 (1992)).
61. Email from Peter G. Wacht, Executive Director, National Academy of Elder Law
Attorneys, to Hyman G. Darling, Author (Mar. 11, 2019, 8:53 AM) (on file with law review).
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Will that indicates their wish not to be kept alive unless there is a
reasonable likelihood of recovery without a diminished quality of life.
The author has asked hundreds of clients over many years their
preferences, and both himself and the four other attorneys who practice in
the elder law area in his firm have noticed that their clients do not wish to
be kept alive by heroic means. We can probably count on one hand the
number of clients who have indicated they wish to have some sort of life
support, but usually only for some limited time.
Further supporting this point, the National Institute of Nursing
Research has found “widespread dissatisfaction with end-of-life care.”62
This study found that “most individuals with serious, advanced illnesses
preferred to die at home and receive a more conservative pattern of endof-life care.”63 However, a majority of individuals “died in hospitals and
received more aggressive care than was desired.”64 The study also showed
that advanced planning and Physician Orders for Life-Sustaining
Treatments (POLST) forms, similar to the MOLST forms, have reduced
the receipt of “unwanted life sustaining treatments when compared to
patients with traditional Do-Not-Resuscitate orders,” but did not entirely
eliminate such.65
The important take away from the National Institute of Nursing
Research study is that most individuals would choose a less invasive
process when it comes to end-of-life care and decisions regarding lifesustaining treatments.66 The question therein is: why is life-sustaining
treatment and the state’s interest superseding the personal interests and
constitutional rights of individuals?

62. NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., FACT SHEET:
END-OF-LIFE 1 (Oct. 2010), https://report.nih.gov/NIHfactsheets/Pdfs/EndOfLife(NINR).pdf
[https://perma.cc/FJX9-YPHP].
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 2.
66. Id. at 1.
In 1997, a report from the Institute of Medicine found widespread dissatisfaction
with end-of-life care. While most individuals with serious, advanced illnesses
preferred to die at home and receive a more conservative pattern of end-of-life
care; the majority died in hospitals and received more aggressive care than was
desired.
Id.; see COMM. ON CARE AT THE END OF LIFE, APPROACHING DEATH: IMPROVING CARE AT
THE END OF LIFE (Marilyn J. Field & Christine K. Cassel eds., 1997), https://www.nap.edu/
read/5801/chapter/1 [https://perma.cc/7GXX-UYLR].
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B. Better Understanding Priorities and Better Serving the People
While Massachusetts has made great strides introducing the MOLST
form, it has not yet fully understood its citizens’ desires and needs. The
National Institutes of Health pointed out that most of those interviewed
would prefer to die in the comfort of their own homes and avoid
unnecessary and invasive life-prolonging treatment.67 Why, then, does the
accepted standard of care require the involuntary use of life-sustaining
treatment in situations when it is clear that there will be no improvement
in the individual’s quality of life?
This Article proposes a new standard of care for patients with a
terminal prognosis and those who suffer traumatic illnesses or injuries
rendering them incompetent, who would normally be involuntarily
subjected to invasive life-sustaining treatment. Given that the majority of
individuals would not wish to be subjected to invasive treatments when
their quality of life has no chance of improving, the standard of care
should be to forego life-sustaining treatment and to put the constitutional
privacy rights of individuals first.
As Massachusetts already has the MOLST form, a specifically
authorized document that dictates end-of-life decision-making, it follows
that such a form could shift its function. With appropriate legislation, the
default standard of care could be changed to require removing involuntary
life-sustaining treatment, in reference to specifically tailored criteria, and
the MOLST form could be redrafted and become the required form for
those who wish to receive life-sustaining treatment. This would better
encapsulate the wishes of the majority of citizens and shift the burden of
electing for life-sustaining treatment, or notifying healthcare providers of
their intent to be placed on such treatment, to the minority of individuals
who wish to receive these treatment measures. This Article does not
suggest that these measures be ceased instantly and require the cessation
of life-sustaining treatment in all situations, but it does propose that the
impetus for challenging the removal of such should be placed upon the
state. Further, such challenges should be the exception and should only
be used in those extraordinary circumstances where clear and convincing
evidence indicates what the intentions of the incapacitated person were as
opposed to the health care proxy’s actions.
C. Other Options Still Do Not Go Far Enough
Bioethicist John D. Arras, presented another option: “‘Instead of
imposing a strict presumption of treatment requiring families to prove that
67. NAT’L INSTS. OF HEALTH, supra note 62, at 1.

2019]

MY LIFE, MY CHOICE

303

they have a uniquely correct answer to the problem, we should rather
presume that families and friends know best and that others should be
required to prove them wrong.’”68 As noted in Cohen’s article, however,
this approach is still an “adjudicatory model” that places the decision back
into the arena of judicial control.69 Shifting this presumption creates a
more ideal scenario for families who are in touch with the wishes of the
individual and protects the individual from the personal views of an
appointed guardian ad litem, which may conflict with the intentions of the
petitioner. However, the Arras model still does not go far enough in
protecting the privacy interests of incompetent individuals.
A document should be afforded the integrity it deserves to make an
individual’s medical decisions and either opt for or opt out of medical
treatment at the time of an end-of-life decision. When a person is
incapacitated to the extent that they cannot make decisions for themselves,
and that person has not expressed a preference about end-of-life treatment,
problems arise. Usually the ethics committee reviews the status of the
patient. It is important to recognize that the four cases noted in this Article
are the primary cases that have achieved national attention, with one
gaining attention in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. However, on
a daily basis, decisions are made in hospitals, nursing homes, and hospice
situations at home, about whether people are permitted to carry out their
wishes and not adhere to the requirement of being kept alive by artificial
nutrition, heroics, machines, or other extraordinary means.
D. The Dangers of Parens Patriae
States continue to grapple with the concepts of best interest and
privacy rights and their balance in the equation of what is considered
protecting health and welfare. Prior to 1999, existing New York case law
and statutory law provided that “the state’s interest, as parens patriae, in
protecting health and welfare” required a holding that a “guardian could
not seek to discontinue treatment on behalf of a ward who was never
competent.”70
In 1999, Sheila Pouliot, “a severely mentally retarded woman,”
became terminally ill “and suffered greatly, and needlessly, because the
68. Cohen, supra note 60, at 268 (quoting John D. Arras & James Rachels, Beyond
Cruzan: Individual Rights, Family Autonomy and the Persistent Vegetative State, in
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHICS 404, 408 (Tom L. Beauchamp & LeRoy Walters eds.,
1994)).
69. Id.
70. In re Guardianship of Chantel Nicole R., 34 A.D.3d 99, 103 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006)
(emphasis added).
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[state’s interest as parens patriae] required that she receive care, even
though doctors concluded that it was futile.”71 Sheila “lived on for several
weeks, allegedly in pain” the entire time72 “over the [protests] of her sister
and the ethics board of the treating hospital.”73 Sheila’s case was widely
publicized, and shortly thereafter New York passed the Health Care
Decisions Act for Persons with Mental Retardation74 to afford guardians
some “latitude in determining whether medical care should be
administered to a ward who was never competent to make decisions
regarding medical treatment.”75
However, New York law still prohibited close family members, even
spouses, from making health care decisions on behalf of incapacitated
persons unless that person had prepared clear and convincing instructions
outlining their wishes. Individuals without the foresight or knowledge of
the need to have an advanced directive in place continued to be kept alive
through the use of medical apparatuses such as life support—
extraordinary means that states justified under the concept of parens
patriae. It was not until some ten years later that the New York legislature
passed the Family Health Care Decisions Act,76 which provided that
health care decisions for adult patients could be made by surrogates in the
absence of a health care proxy or advanced directive.77 While substantive
changes in the law have afforded families, friends, and health care
providers more guidance when it comes to end-of-life decision-making,
cases such as that of Sheila Pouliot stand as an excellent reminder of the
negative consequences of the parens patriae approach to end-of-life
decision-making.

71. Id. at 104.
72. Id. Dr. Kathy Faber-Langendoen, Director of the Center for Bioethics and Humanities
at SUNY Upstate Medical University, testified in Albany that “[Shelia] died a very painful,
gruesome death. It was inhumane. She suffered greatly because of the law.” End-of-Life
Decisions: New Law Will Make It Easier for Families and Doctors, SYRACUSE.COM (Mar. 9,
2010, 5:02 AM), http://blog.syracuse.com/opinion/2010/03/end-of-life_decisions_new_
law.html [https://perma.cc/6762-L3JG] (discussing Sheila Pouliot’s death).
73. In re Guardianship of Chantel, 34 A.D.3d at 104.
74. Health Care Decisions Act for Persons with Mental Retardation, 2002 N.Y. Sess.
Laws ch. 500 (McKinney) (codified as amended at N.Y. SURR. CT. PROC. ACT LAW §§ 1750 to
1750-b (McKinney 2019)).
75. In re Guardianship of Chantel, 34 A.D.3d at 104.
76. See generally N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2994-a to 2994-u (McKinney 2018)
(enacted on June 1, 2010).
77. Id.
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CONCLUSION
Justice Cardozo stated that “[e]very human being of adult years and
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own
body.”78 This language would precipitate the shaping of what would come
to be a protected liberty interest in bodily integrity. The culmination of
this was further evidenced by the Supreme Court through its statement
that “[i]t is settled now . . . that the Constitution places limits on a State’s
right to interfere with a person’s most basic decisions about . . . bodily
integrity.”79
The Supreme Court has determined that a “Constitutional recognition
of the right to bodily integrity underlies the assumed right, good against
the state, to require physicians to terminate artificial life support.”80 But
if this is so, why do states still require protracted legal battles when dealing
with end-of-life decision-making and the termination of life-sustaining
measures? Citizens possess an inherent legal “right to refuse lifesaving
hydration and nutrition”81 and this inherent right should continue to be
preserved beyond the incompetency of an individual. This is exactly the
type of situation that could benefit from a modernized and re-purposed
MOLST form, which would be used when an individual wishes to elect
life-sustaining treatment, as opposed to the alternative preferred by a
majority of individuals.
The time has come for a change to the existing law and procedure
relative to the presumption of wanting to be kept alive by extraordinary
means. Those who have a desire to maintain their lives by any means
possible should have to exhibit a preference by signing a form so stating
their preference, and all others will be presumed to not wish extraordinary
means be utilized to preserve life. Until that time, every person should
have a validated health care proxy, power of attorney, and properly drafted
will outlining their wishes.

78. Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (discussing
patients’ rights to direct their medical care).
79. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 777 (1997) (alteration and omissions in
original) (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992)).
80. Id. at 778.
81. Id. at 703 (citing Cruzan ex rel. Cruzan v. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 279
(1990)).

